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ABSTRACT
Innovative policy measures often imply institutional adjustments. 
Whether such adjustments are accomplished often depends upon 
the presence of institutional entrepreneurship: actors who take 
responsibility to initiate the necessary actions to redesign existing 
institutional practices. The question arises under which conditions 
can institutional entrepreneurship be developed? And, what might 
be the cause of lacking institutional entrepreneurship? In this article, 
the latter question is examined through in-depth collaborative 
research project for exploring alternative, adaptive flood risk 
strategies for flood proofing the unembanked area of the north-end 
of the city district Feijenoord in Rotterdam. Due to climate change, 
these areas are increasingly vulnerable to flooding. The traditional, 
institutionalized solution of raising the ground level before initiating 
new spatial developments does not suffice in the long term. Therefore, 
the city government explored alternative strategies for more adaptive 
ways of dealing with flood risks. Together with representatives of 
key stakeholders in the area, two key strategies for the unembanked 
areas were elaborated. These strategies have significant implications 
for the distribution of costs, risks and responsibilities and necessitate 
alternative governance architectures that exceed the current 
institutional structures. During the research project, it became clear 
that the developed alternative strategies fundamentally differed 
from the current institutional system. Thus, institutional redesign was 
necessary. This proved to be virtually impossible, especially because 
none of the involved actors was willing nor capable of undertaking 
entrepreneurial activities to start such redesign. This observation led 
us to further investigate into the causes and the consequences of the 
absent entrepreneurship.
1. Introduction
The policy field of climate adaptation is relatively new. Although in the 1970s some schol-
ars (Bolin, 1970; Keeling et al., 1976) addressed the influence of greenhouse gas on the 
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agenda. Nowadays, actors at different levels of scale in various policy fields, among which 
urban planning, are processing the expected impacts in new policies, plans and measures. 
Especially in vulnerable and poorly protected urban zones, such as the unembanked areas 
in Dutch cities like Rotterdam and Dordrecht, the ‘invention’ of new policies for climate 
adaptive urban development is much needed. However, this proves to be rather difficult as 
the formal policy responsibility seems to be ‘vacant’ and institutional rules are lacking: in 
the Netherlands, no policy authority is formally responsible for safeguarding unembanked 
urban areas. This institutional ‘void’ calls for pro-active entrepreneurship of actors to ‘invent’ 
and implement suitable policies, planning strategies and effective measures to reduce the 
areas’ vulnerability, which also implies institutional redesign.
We are especially interested in the difficulties to come to effective institutional entre-
preneurship which is needed to overcome the often-called implementation gap in climate 
adaptation (Wejs, Harvold, Larsen, & Saglie, 2014). In our case – dealing with flood risks 
in the unembanked areas of the Dutch city of Rotterdam – innovative policy strategies were 
designed, but the step toward implementation was not taken. One of the reasons was the 
change resistance of the institutional context and the lack of effective institutional entre-
preneurship. In this article, we answer the question why no effective institutional entrepre-
neurship was developed and which role the institutional context plays in obstructing the 
evolution of this entrepreneurship.
The case study used in this paper is a research project in which alternative flood risk 
management strategies were developed for the unembanked areas of the Dutch city of 
Rotterdam. These strategies were developed in a collaborative research project with stake-
holders, officials and experts. As researchers we were involved in one of the latter phases of 
this project, to assess the institutional consequences of these strategies, and to explore pos-
sible governance arrangements for their implementation. The research project was executed 
in close collaboration with representatives of the main stakeholders in the area. During its 
course it became clear that the developed alternative strategies for flood risk management 
fundamentally differed from the current institutional system. Thus, institutional redesign 
was necessary. However, institutional entrepreneurship was not developed because no one 
of the involved actors seemed to be willing nor capable of undertaking entrepreneurial 
activities to start such redesign. Moreover, the institutional context proved to be very rigid. 
Then, the question can be posed how these two relate.
This article is based upon an in-depth collaborative research and builds on previous 
studies about the institutional context and potential technical and/or spatial measures for 
flood-proofing the area (Kokx & Spit, 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2014; Van Veelen, 2013). 
Both components constitute the institutional redesign challenge that was put before repre-
sentatives of the main actors in the designated area.
2. Institutional entrepreneurship – theory and relevance
2.1. Institutions and institutional change
The perceived need for changing a policy status quo often originates from the observation 
that existing structures and routines cannot cope with new problems. Also, the need for 
developing new pathways stems from the desire to seize emerging possibilities. Existing 
structures and routines that set reality for actors, both organizations and individuals, thus 
POLICY AND SOCIETY  577
prescribing, guiding and rewarding or sanctioning their behavior are often referred to as 
institutions (Hoffman, 1999; Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutional conditions deter-
mine whether behavior in a particular institutional or policy field is appropriate or legitimate 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).
There are many ways of analyzing institutions. In this article, we use the framework for 
institutional analysis as proposed by Williamson (1998) and adjusted by Koppenjan and 
Groenewegen (2005), distinguishing between four levels of institutions (see Table 1).
The capacity or agency to work toward new routines and developing alternative struc-
tures, resisting the powers of institutional path-dependency, calls for pro-active behavior, 
often framed as entrepreneurship. Change following from entrepreneurship indicates the 
deviation or crossing of some kind of (societal) norm (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). This devi-
ation from what is ‘normal’ will become scrutinized. Deviating ideas or practices will have 
to gain wider legitimacy if they want to ‘survive’. As such, legitimacy struggles will occur 
because what may appear to be new and valuable to one social group may seem threatening 
to another (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007).
An important aspect of institutional revision depends on the actual room for adjustments, 
the ability and willingness to implement changes. When policies fundamentally differ from 
the current institutional system, resistance and institutional rigidity are likely to emerge 
(Gupta et al., 2010; Matthews, Lo, & Byrne, 2015). Although institutions are perceived 
to be highly change-resistant, they actually do change. Normally institutional change is 
approached from a rather evolutionary perspective in which change results from a misfit 
between new circumstances and old institutions (Oliver, 1992). Institutional change is also 
frequently approached from a more political stance: institutions are subject to conflict 
because of different interests. Relative power differences explain whether institutions resist 
or actually change (Håkansson & Johansson, 1993; Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005). Finally, 
institutional change can also be described from a transaction costs perspective. It results 
from more rational considerations: institutional rules are adjusted when this is necessary 
to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1998). In other words: ‘If institutions fail to fulfill 
stability or bring about non-decision-making and mobilization of bias, there is ground for 
institutional (re)design’ (Ghorbani, Ligtvoet, Nikolic, & Dijkema, 2010, p. 3).
The latter form of institutional change can be seen as a form of deliberate change, referring 
to the domain of institutional design. Institutional design can be defined as: ‘the devising and 
realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain 
behavior and action so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute 
given tasks’ (Alexander, 2005). In the context of this paper, we would define institutional 
design as: the deliberate attempt to modify, add or remove institutional rules within a certain 
policy domain in order to enable the production of alternative policy objectives.
Table 1. a framework for institutional analysis based on Williamson (1998) and Koppenjan and Groe-
newegen (2005).
Meta-level: norms and principles norms, values, codes, orientation, culture, informal institutions 
Macro-level: rules and laws Formal rules, laws, regulations, constitutions and the process arrange-
ments that constitute them
Meso-level: decision-making and collaboration covenants, contracts, agreements, plans and the processes that 
constitute them
Micro-level: interactions actors and interactions, aimed at creating or influencing services, 
provisions, planning, outcomes
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There are also authors who approach both the concepts of institutions and policy change 
from a more nuanced position which leave room to study the possibilities to alter the rules 
of the game when new policy ideas mature (cf. Goodin, 1998; Weimer, 1995). They draw 
attention to the role of individuals in altering the institutional rules of the game, and have 
coined the concept of institutional entrepreneurship for this.
2.2. Institutional change and entrepreneurship: balancing between structure and 
agency?
Combining institutions and entrepreneurship was first proposed by DiMaggio (1988, 14): 
‘new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an oppor-
tunity to realize interests that they value highly’. Pro-active actors, the institutional entre-
preneurs, create new systems of meaning that connect the functioning of disparate sets of 
institutions together (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002). Institutional entrepreneurship 
is aimed at doing something new, often in a new manner. These notions indicate the rele-
vance of developing a theory to explain how institutions are created and become diffused 
and stabilized through behavior of actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).
Institutional entrepreneurs can be perceived as actors who look and go beyond the rules 
of the game, past the boundaries of ‘the system of meaning’. As such, they are capable of 
acting as change agents (Fliegel & Kivlin, 1966; Garud et al., 2007), breaching the existing 
state of affairs, causing new dynamics which might transform existing institutions and/
or stimulate new ones. This indicates the importance of agency as driving force behind 
institutional change.
Agency is the capacity of an actor, whether an organization or an individual, to act in any 
given environment. Here, it refers to the capacity to act or perform with (some) freedom of 
choice, regardless of being immersed in an institutional context. Or as Scott (1995) poses 
it, the ability of actors to intentionally pursue interests and exert some influence of their 
environment. It is important to investigate into the characteristics of agency to prevent the 
all too simplistic idea that the capacity to act as a change agent is an externally given talent 
(Delmestri, 2006; Meyer, 2006). Therefore, Garud, Hardy, and Maguire (2007, p. 67) propose 
to examine the factors that ‘enable the emergence of institutional entrepreneurship despite 
institutional pressures towards stasis’.
Wijen and Ansari advocate to direct more attention to endogenously driven institutional 
change ‘where purposeful actors overcome the agency – structure paradox’ (2006, p. 1081). 
They observe that collective interests do not always result in collective action. This is espe-
cially the case in situations of collective action dilemmas (Oliver, 1992). These situations are 
characterized by a so-called double paradox (Wijen & Ansari, 2006, p. 1080). First, actors 
have to bridge the gap between agency and structure by overcoming constraints to initiate 
change. Second, actors need to find ways of coping with the tension between the need for 
collective action and the individual interests that oppose change, or even stimulate collective 
inertia. The latter paradox is caused by the fear of free riding, actors waiting for each other 
to take initiative and the misconception by actors of their actual capacity to contribute to 
problem-solving.
The question is here how the endogenous factors that cause the collective action par-
adox might be overcome. For each endogenous factor, Wijen and Ansari have identified 
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strategies that can stimulate cooperation between ‘numerous dispersed actors’ (2007, p. 
1084) (Table 2).
These factors can be influenced by pro-active, entrepreneurial actors in search for insti-
tutional change. As such, institutional entrepreneurs must have access to social and political 
capacities to stimulate other actors by creating shared meaning and identities and gradually 
altering the actual state-of-affairs by taking other important interest bases into account. Such 
a process is often referred to as ‘leveraging’ (Dorado, 2005). In order to legitimize the allies to 
pursue the desired change, institutional entrepreneurs must provide them with an attractive 
and convincing story that enables them to mobilize their constituencies (see also Battilana, 
Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). This change-oriented discourse balances familiarity and rec-
ognition with innovation and uncertainty. Allies and their constituencies must be able to 
recognize the story, as well as be inspired to accept and follow it toward a new situation.
2.3. Institutional entrepreneurship as process of alliancing
Earlier, we indicated that agency is the capacity to act in a certain institutional environment 
(cf. Scott, 1995). To be capable of acting, an agent must be competent to articulate the need 
for moving from the current state of affairs toward a more desirable situation. In addition, 
the agent must be capable of acquiring resources, support and legitimacy to redesign the 
institutional conditions. As Wijen and Ansari rightfully observe, many complex, multi-sec-
tor policy domains cannot be changed by key actors singlehandedly. They need to organize 
a broader array of actors to collaboratively assume responsibility and take action to initiate 
change. Institutional entrepreneurs must be well aware of the fact significant change cannot 
be reached without support from other actors. As such, they must be capable of identifying 
potential supporters, opponents and other actors that might be in the position to either 
stimulate or block the desired change. Mobilizing allies also refers to the ability to attract 
and align the change supporting actors in productive alliances.
Table 2. endogenous factors for institutional change (Wijen & ansari, 2006).
Endogenous factors Strategies
Manipulating the power configuration achieving power concentration to reduce opinion diversity
controlling resources to stimulate collaboration
inducing cooperation by (relatively) powerful actors
creating common ground Framing to induce cooperation by appealing to mutual identity and 
interests
Setting an agenda that others believe to be in their own interests
expressing tangible and task-oriented goals
Spreading public knowledge to make an issue more familiar and amena-
ble to acceptance
Mobilizing bandwagons enrolling large numbers of other participants through the process of 
alliance building
devising appropriate incentive structures encouraging cooperation by reducing transaction costs
creating appropriate incentive structures
Raising awareness of non-compliance costs
issue linkage to widen to scope for mutually beneficial exchanges
applying ethical guidelines invoking ethical factors for cooperation, such as fairness, equity and 
altruism
creating compliance through shared aversion for negative outcomes
Using implementation mechanisms Building implementation capacity through information transfer, research 
grants, technical assistance training and management expertise
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For making significant institutional change possible, the entrepreneur will have to acquire 
the necessary resources. Often, these resources exceed the entrepreneur’s own assets, making 
the capacity of mobilizing allies ever more important. Financial resources are indispensable 
to overcome the initiation costs for bringing allies together and pay for withstanding even-
tual obstructive actions of opponents. Next to financial means, acquiring formal authority 
and ‘attracting’ social capital are equally valuable for institutional change (Battilana et al., 
2009). Formal authority – an actor’s legitimized right to make decisions (Phillips, Lawrence, 
& Hardy, 2000, p. 33) – enables institutional entrepreneurs to make novel ideas and their 
supporting stories, more legitimate, acceptable and admissible for both allies and their 
constituencies. Social capital as a resource connects to the entrepreneurs’ efforts to mobi-
lize allies. It refers to the position entrepreneurs need to have in the actor network, to be 
capable of influencing other actors that are needed for the desired change. Social capital 
also indicates the entrepreneurs’ capacity of ‘orchestrating collective action among diverse 
stakeholders’ (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Maguire, 2007). This facilitates the con-
ception of a collaborative story about the desired direction for change.
It is important to acknowledge that institutional entrepreneurship is a form of embedded 
agency. It takes place within a pre-structured and predetermined context which allows for 
change efforts to a certain extent. Subsequently, the context also influences the possibilities 
to create the conditions for successful entrepreneurship and thus its emergence. The question 
how the current institutional regime influences the emergence of entrepreneurship and to 
what extent the necessary conditions for successful entrepreneurship, given the current 
institutional conditions can be pursued, is important to assess the actors’ ability to tamper 
with the endogenous factors. The remainder of this article is devoted to answer this question.
3. Research design: collaborative case study research and data collection
The study underlying this paper was part of the national Knowledge for Climate Research 
Program that ran from 2007 to 2014 and co-financed by the Dutch ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment. It builds further on a number of preceding studies that were also 
partially conducted within this national research program. These studies examined the 
institutional landscape of policy-making for unembanked urban areas in the Netherlands 
and Rotterdam in specific (Batterbee et al., 2010; Van der Lee, 2013) and potential technical 
and spatial flood proofing measures that are deemed feasible in the designated case study 
area (Nabielek-Kronberger, Doepel, & Stone, 2012; Van Vliet, 2012; Van Vliet & Aerts, 
2014; Veerbeek et al., 2010).
Between October 2012 and July 2013, representatives of the most important stakehold-
ers assessed and selected feasible and viable technical and/or spatial measures in order to 
flood proof the area. The collaborative research project was inspired by the ideas on par-
ticipatory policy analysis (Dunn, 1994; Durning, 1993). Through collaborative selection 
of individual measures, practical strategies would be formed that could be implemented 
by one or a coalition of represented stakeholders. Based on the selections of measures, two 
main strategies were developed. The potential strategies represent trade-offs between costs 
(investments, nuisance) and benefits (increased safety and protection). These two strategies 
were assessed regarding their institutional implications for the stakeholders involved. As 
such, the representatives were asked to explore potential government arrangements for the 
implementation of the strategies. Last, experts of the national Delta Program were asked 
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to discuss the possibilities to support the developed strategies, e.g. by adopting it into this 
national policy program aimed at flood proofing the Dutch territory.
3.1. Data collection
Through triangulation in the data collection methods – document analysis, in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews and group sessions – the ambitions and values of these stake-
holders were identified. The inclusion of these stakeholders in the three data collection 
methods is listed in Table 3.
The document analysis revealed the objectives of the stakeholders involved about flood 
risks and its potential consequences as well as management strategies for flood protection 
and mitigating eventual impacts. After the document analysis, interviews were conducted 
with representatives of the stakeholders involved to elaborate their ambitions and values as 
well as their willingness and ability to contribute to the conception and implementation of 
alternative strategies. Based on the results of document analysis and interviews, four group 
sessions were organized to explore alternative strategies for future flood risk management in 
the area. The components for these strategies were derived from the ambitions and values of 
the stakeholders in the city district. As such, these ambitions and values revealed the desired 
situation in the area, envisaged by the stakeholders involved in the research project (Table 4).
Based on the data collection, a description of the case study is presented as well as:
(1)  the institutional design of the current situation following Williamson’s four levels 
of institutional analysis;
(2)  the stakeholders’ specifications of the desired situation, and the subsequent design 
space (in terms of conditions and objectives) that follows from them;
Table 3. inclusion of stakeholders in the data collection.
Document analysis In-depth interviews Group sessions
city government y y y
city district Feijenoord y y y
Housing association y y y
Real estate owners y y, partially y
citizens n y n 
Businesses y, partially n y, partially
Regional water board y y n 
asset managers of civic infrastructures n y n
Provincial authority y y n
national authority y y y
Table 4. Participants and outcome of the four group sessions.
Group session Participants Outcome 
1 Public authorities at the local level ambitions and values of the local public author-
ities about future flood risk management
2 Public authorities and private stakeholders at 
the local level
ambitions and values of local private stakehold-
ers about future flood risk management
Between group sessions 2 and 3, researchers identified the components for two alternative strate-
gies
3 Public authorities and private stakeholders at 
the local level
Verification and assessment of two alternative 
strategies
4 Public authorities at the national level Reflection and prioritization of the two alterna-
tive strategies
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(3)  the stakeholders’ account of strategies with which the institutional gap between 
current and desired situation might be solved.
4. Case study description: the unembanked areas in Rotterdam
Due to climate change, the unembanked areas of Rotterdam’s city district Feijenoord are 
increasingly vulnerable for flooding. The local public authority is responsible for the facilita-
tion of spatial development in this vulnerable unembanked area. The prevailing local flood 
risk policy is based upon a formal regulation to raise the ground level of new building lots 
to the 1/10.000 storm surge flood level. The current storm surge flood level height is set to 
a level that fluctuates between 3.90 and 4.10 m above sea level, depending on the specific 
local conditions, such as expected wind direction and wave upset. This policy implies that 
new buildings and assets have to be raised to approx. 1 m above average street level. For 
existing urban areas, there is no additional regulation in effect to minimize the effects of a 
potential flood. Homeowners are responsible for possible damages caused by a flood and to 
take precautionary measures. At this moment, they are poorly informed about local flood 
risks. Community disaster management is currently limited to closing-off quay sections 
and other public areas.
The current policy results in urban areas with a patchwork of ground levels of different 
heights, creating a disorderly and unsecure urban landscape. In addition, the policy is 
perceived to be not feasible anymore because of its inflexibility and high costs for both 
municipality and private investors. It simply hampers new investments in unembanked 
urban areas, especially when the return on investments is relatively low when building new 
houses for the lower incomes.
Because of the shared perception that the current policy has too many negative side 
effects, the city government of Rotterdam explores alternative strategies, aiming for a more 
adaptive way of dealing with flood risk. This fits into the more general picture of Rotterdam 
(and other large cities) which proactively tries to deal with the consequences of climate 
change (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Ward et al., 2013).
The national government has allocated responsibility for flood risk of the unembanked 
area to local governments. Local public authorities are responsible for deciding whether 
and under what conditions spatial development in flood plain zones is allowed. Integrating 
flood risk management in spatial planning, however, has proved to be problematic. In the 
Dutch prevention-based flood risk management system, there is little or no experience with 
the accommodation of flooding, causing lack of knowledge on flood-proofing measures 
and methods (De Moel, van Vliet, & Aerts, 2013; Van Vliet & Aerts, 2014). Currently, flood 
risk management is not included in zoning plans, and only on voluntary basis risks are 
mentioned in zoning documents to inform stakeholders. Flood-proof building regulations 
are neither included in the National Building Act nor in local building codes. In addition, 
flood zoning as an instrument in existing areas does not suffice as land use zoning plans 
are no appropriate legal instruments to change current functions. Only recently the pro-
vincial government is thinking about assisting local governments in weighing flood risks 
in spatial planning of unembanked areas (Van der Lee, 2013). In addition, flood risks are 
not included in home insurance.
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4.1. Analysis of the current institutional regime
To explore the institutional design challenge for local urban climate adaptation, an analysis 
of the present and desired situation is necessary. This means an inquiry into the current 
institutional conditions of climate adaptation policy and its consequences for urban devel-
opment in unembanked areas. As said, we use Williamson’s (1998) framework to conduct 
the analysis of the current institutional regime around flood risk management of the unem-
banked areas in Rotterdam (Table 5).
It is interesting to note that there is much ambiguity about the responsibilities and lia-
bilities for flood risk management in unembanked areas. Although the formal policy states 
that inhabitants are responsible for their own safety, the local government does have a 
responsibility for communication and (risk-sensitive) spatial planning. In addition, there 
are strong drivers to downplay the issue of flood risk safety because of the costs for project 
developers to meet local norms and because of falling house prices when flood risks are 
communicated forthright (Kokx, 2012). Finally, actors mainly try to shift away their respon-
sibility to other actors. Property owners are looking at the local government and vice versa. 
The national and provincial governments refuse to assume formal responsibility, leaving 
the issue entirely to the local government. In turn, the local government asks for national 
attention and resources for climate proofing their unembanked areas.
The current regime is represented by the values of the local private stakeholders in the 
area, more specifically the main real estate owners/investors, the housing association, two 
large companies (of which only one actively cooperated in the research) and the asset man-
ager of civic infrastructures which appeared to be more or less coherent with those of the 
local government. Besides lowering the possibility of casualties, most stakeholder values 
refer to preventing liability for flooding and responsibility for assuming additional costs 
for the own organization. Also, they acknowledge the necessity to prevent house prices for 
private homeowners from collapsing and safeguarding private real estate properties from 
Table 5. institutional analysis of the current regime for unembanked areas.
Analysis of the current institutional regime
1 Norms, values, codes, orientation, culture, informal institutions
almost 50% of the population in the Rotterdam area does not think about the risks of living in an unembanked 
area. one of the important reasons for this is that dutch inhabitants expect the government to be responsible 
and pay for damages if flooding takes place (Rli, 2011)
2 Formal rules, laws, regulations, constitutions
there are no legal norms for flood risk safety in unembanked areas. Residents are responsible themselves 
for measures to reduce damages to their properties due to flooding. the assessment of the actual safety 
level and communication about this matter are the responsibility of local and regional institutions. there is 
ambiguity with regard to liability for damage: inhabitants are responsible, but local authorities have to inform 
them properly and are responsible to take wise planning decisions
3 Covenants, contracts, agreements, plans
local authorities test planning applications and give permits for building activities
the Public Safety Region is responsible for the accessibility of unembanked areas for emergency services. this 
authority provides advice to local government about public safety risks in general but not at the level of 
concrete spatial plans. there is a regional risk and disaster management plan but not specifically focused on 
unembanked areas
4 Actors and interactions, aimed at creating or influencing services, provisions, planning, outcomes
Regarding spatial developments, the local government sets specific standards to the project developer with 
regard to elevating the surface before building. in planning processes, public and private stakeholders try 
to find creative solutions to realize these standards at minimal costs. Regular maintenance operations in the 
public space (streets, sidewalks, squares) are used to adjust the street level to the new height
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flood damage. This is in sharp contrast with the local residents, as interviews indicate that 
they do not perceive any problem yet.
The local private stakeholders emphasize the continuous uncertainty about the feasibility 
and the costs of the current policy which decreases their willingness to invest. The long-term 
accuracy and viability of considerable investments in area development and real estate are 
very important to them. In addition, the housing corporation stressed their responsibility 
for providing houses for lower incomes, which complicates investing in this area because 
of the higher costs due to the responsibility of raising ground levels to achieve the required 
water safety standards.
The involved stakeholders agree that an alternative policy is more preferable compared 
to the current strategy of land elevation based upon local, public norm-setting. Although 
using different argumentations, all actors are convinced that a more flexible, tailor-made 
strategy is necessary to be able to deal with the consequences of climate change in the long 
term (Kokx & Spit, 2012). At the same time, such an integrated approach requires new roles 
from the stakeholders as well as new governance arrangements to enable implementation of 
this strategy (Van Veelen, 2013). The local public authorities acknowledge that the current 
policy is an obstacle for spatial investments because of the high costs associated with land 
elevation. However, they are hesitant to change this policy and to become solely responsible 
for realizing and (co-)financing alternative strategies. The same holds true for the private 
stakeholders: they are willing to think about alternative strategies but are not willing to 
accept the consequences in terms of more (financial) responsibilities.
4.2. Specifications of the desired situation and the subsequent design space
Next, the specifications of the desired policy regime can be explored. This new policy regime 
can be achieved by an alternative strategy for flood risk management that combines a sub-
stantive solution with an institutional arrangement between stakeholders involved. However, 
our analysis shows the ambiguity in their positions toward the issue. They all underline the 
shortcomings of the current strategy. But they all try to defend their own position within 
the current institutional regime, both in terms of responsibilities and obligations. In other 
words, they are mainly concerned with safeguarding their own position and ‘wait and see’ 
whether other actors make a first move.
This brief institutional analysis specifies the design space – that is the gap between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ – that must be bridged in order to reach a more desired situation:
•  Shared responsibility between public authorities at different levels of scale, and with 
private stakeholders because none of the actors can individually take responsibility 
for an alternative strategy;
•  Increased awareness at the local residents and private stakeholders with regard to the 
potential flood risks and the formal division of responsibilities for flood risk manage-
ment, including their own responsibility for taking appropriate measures;
•  More flexible, co-creative and inclusive approaches to urban development and spatial 
planning in these types of areas. E.g. by coupling area-oriented investments with flood 
risk management;
•  Formulating an equalizing mechanism for sharing costs among initiators and new 
entrants.
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In summary, the design challenge for institutional entrepreneurs to escape from the 
deadlocked situation in the area is coined in Table 6.
Stakeholders indicate the following conditions for a new institutional arrangement that 
should support an alternative flood risk management strategy. First, future private real 
estate property owners in the area (new entrants) must be denied the opportunity of free 
riding. If they want to develop real estate after collective flood risk measures are taken, 
they must be willing to compensate for the investments done earlier. Second, ways for fair 
distribution of costs between all involved actors must be explored. Third, actors aim for 
maximizing the efficiency by coupling adaptation measures and other spatial investment 
projects into integrated investments. And fourth, efforts must be undertaken to prevent 
current residents, both private homeowners and tenants, and private real estate property 
owners from becoming anxious about the potential risk of flooding. This must guarantee 
the area’s livability and attractiveness.
4.3. Tackling the design challenge: two alternative strategies
After an intensive process of exploring the physical conditions of the area and through 
selection of potential technical-spatial measures for flood risk management, the stakehold-
ers formulated two alternative flood risk strategies: the individual-adaptive strategy and 
the collective-preventive strategy. The first strategy is object-oriented, the second strategy 
is an area-oriented approach. The first strategy relies on the responsibility of private real 
estate investors and private homeowners to take (their own) necessary measures for flood 
protecting their property. This strategy departs from the idea that it is better to adapt to the 
risk of flooding, by taking individual measures in buildings. The second strategy is based 
upon flood prevention and is aimed at taking precautionary measures for safeguarding the 
entire unembanked area of Feijenoord’s north-end, by collective infrastructural measures.
Both pathways are deemed feasible. At the same time, both strategies do not fit within 
the current institutional regime. The first strategy would rely on individual private home-
owners, private real estate owners and investors and owners of civic infrastructure to take 
their own measures to protect their own object or property, whether it be a single home or 
an entire high-rise building with rental apartments. This approach goes beyond the current 
practice of relying on public authorities to take action. Each of these actors would have to 
take responsibility to conceive and implement appropriate measures to flood proof their 
private property. The degree of adaptiveness of the private property in the area will thus 
depend on the individual wet proof or dry proof measures property owners are willing 
and able to take.
The individual-adaptive strategy presupposes the local government to allow for more 
degrees of freedom for less equality between residents with regard to water safety. As such, 
Table 6. the design challenge for institutional entrepreneurship.
Current regime (Is) Desired regime (Ought)
Substantive component (What) Standard ground-level elevation to 
approx. 4 m above sea level; inflexible 
and not cost effective
Flexible and cost-effective adjustment 
to actual flood risks
Procedural component (How) Formal responsibility at local authority, 
without material resources to act 
upon this
Flood protection as a collaborative 
responsibility and joint initiative to 
arrange it
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the local government should refrain from its responsibility for guaranteeing certain stand-
ards for water safety. This strategy allows for more freedom for real estate investors and 
private homeowners to take appropriate flood risk measures as they see fit with regard to 
the desired spatial development of the area. It also gives them more responsibility to take 
care of their own properties.
The second strategy requires the local public authority to come up with a solution that 
protects the entire area against flooding. This approach is based on the premise that local 
authorities are willing and able to assume responsibility for safeguarding an urban area that 
is prone to flooding. This exceeds the local authority’s current resources, such as expertise 
and financial and organizational capacities. To make this strategy feasible, public and private 
objectives and resources must be acquired, combined and assembled. The degree of protec-
tion in the area will largely depend on the local authority’s agency to acquire these resources 
as each level of protection has its price in terms of required knowledge and financial means.
The collective-preventive strategy requires an entrepreneurial role of the local govern-
ment to take collective flood risk measures, protecting the entire city district in one go. As 
such, the local government guarantees the same level of water safety as in embanked areas. 
In turn, real estate investors and private homeowners are obliged to follow and financially 
contribute to these measures. However, there is no legal instrument to make these actors 
financially contribute for the value increase that results from the increased protection level.
5. The institutional gap and the entrepreneurial deadlock
The feasibility of both strategies was assessed in the fourth and final group session in which 
representatives of the national government participated. These policy experts on water 
safety and flood risk management indicated that the collective-preventive strategy would 
be most feasible. Their expert judgment was largely inspired by the local circumstances at 
that time. Based on the given (physical) circumstances characterized by the short term need 
for reconstruction of deteriorated water fronts and reshaping a public park near the river 
Maas, the local government should be in the position to combine them with the construc-
tion of collective flood prevention measures to protect the entire area. This decreases the 
uncertainty for private stakeholders about the future flood risks in the area and therefore 
stimulates them to start investing again in real estate.
Given the actual, local circumstances, the choice for the collective-preventive strat-
egy seems rather obvious. However, the institutional implications are rather considera-
ble because this strategy would result in the factual embankment of the city district. This 
changes its spatial characteristics as well as its institutional embedding because it will bring 
another government agency – the regional water board – to the stage as principle public 
agency for water safety infrastructures (dikes and levees) in embanked areas. As indicated 
earlier, in the Netherlands, local governments are formally responsible for this without dis-
posing of the required knowledge and financial and organizational resources. In contrast, 
the regional water boards do have these resources but do not bear the formal responsibility 
to protect this specific type of areas. National government denies responsibility for this type 
of areas by excluding them thus far from the scope of the national Delta Program, aimed 
at re-setting the national flood protection levels. As a consequence, the flood proof spatial 
development of the urban unembanked area in the north-end of Feijenoord is not actively 
pursued. This institutional gap might be overcome by undertaking entrepreneurial activities 
POLICY AND SOCIETY  587
within the current regime. Although most actors acknowledge the need for a new policy 
for flood proofing the area, no one of them is stepping up to take on the required entrepre-
neurship. Actors seem to be neither capable nor willing to do so. Both public and private 
actors claim to lack the financial and organizational capacities, and the required expert 
knowledge. In addition, local public authority is hesitant to create some kind of precedence 
for other unembanked areas in Rotterdam, whereas the private actors lack the willingness 
and competencies to take on public tasks such as flood risk management. But perhaps the 
most important reason for the entrepreneurial deadlock is the fact that it is simply too 
far off from their usual core business, tasks and experiences. Actors seem to be hesitant 
to engage in an uncertain and complex situation, precisely what genuine entrepreneurs 
normally thrive in, and stick to the current rules of the game. This leads to the situation 
that for the preferred strategy, the appropriate – who is willing and capable – institutional 
entrepreneur remains lacking.
6. Explaining the consequences for institutional entrepreneurship
The question here is whether the endogenous factors (Wijen & Ansari, 2006) through 
which institutional regimes can be changed can be used to explain the lack of institutional 
entrepreneurship in this specific case study area. Should we suspect that these endogenous 
factors are absent or too rigid? Or that actors are not powerful enough to change them? Or 
perhaps that they do not recognize them as factors that can be influenced?
In Table 7 below, an assessment of these factors and the accompanying strategies is pre-
sented, offering an explanation for the absence of (collective) institutional entrepreneurship 
with regard to the two developed strategies for flood-proofing the area.
Based on Wijen and Ansari’s account of the endogenous factors that can be influenced 
to stimulate collective institutional entrepreneurship, it can be observed that strategies to 
creating common ground, mobilizing bandwagons and/or applying ethical guidelines are 
not actively deployed by either of the stakeholders. This is also the case for the factor devising 
appropriate incentive structures which seems to be absent or overlooked. The manipulation 
of the power configuration could be pursued, although none of the actors involved seems to 
be eager to ‘perform power play’, motivating (or urging) the others to follow in an alterna-
tive direction. And although there seem to be collective interests, the problem of collective 
action remains (Wijen & Ansari, 2006). It is difficult to convince private actors to bear the 
costs of solutions and assume responsibility when there is also (still) the possibility that 
other actors, like the city government, will take on the entire investment and acknowledge 
its formal role. It is thus attractive to ‘wait and see’.
Moreover, the characteristics of the current institutional regime seem to be more suitable 
to explain why it is difficult to develop some kind of institutional entrepreneurship. First of 
all, the implicit norm for citizens and private actors is that the government is responsible 
for flood safety. That makes it difficult to call upon the own responsibility of private actors 
and citizens when it comes to both strategies. There is no sound story in place to convince 
actors that they have a responsibility as well. Second, it is difficult for the water board, the 
city government or the housing cooperation to invest in a collective solution because this 
will result into a precedent with unknown consequences, when other areas also have to 
be protected. The national and provincial governments are not willing to consider taking 
additional responsibilities for this issue, basically because of the same reason.
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Attempts to come to collective action are thus seriously hampered by the existing frag-
mentation in roles and responsibilities. The more innovative activities are hampered by 
the fact that common values and (informal) norms regarding flood protection are deeply 
entrenched and difficult to change. These field characteristics thus made it rather difficult 
to perform the necessary activities for effective entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009). 
The case study seems to indicate that the limited agency to initiate (collective) institutional 
entrepreneurship is not capable of overriding the rigid structure of water safety institutions.
The institutional implications of (one of) the alternative strategies are blocking the inven-
tion of new governance arrangements with which they can be implemented. Actors are 
caught in the present institutional regime and have good reasons to resist policy change 
and subsequent institutional adjustments, although they are convinced that the current 
strategy has had its day. Neither endogenous factors nor a genuine window of opportunity 
(cf. Kingdon, 1984) is powerful enough to push forward one of the two strategies.
7. Conclusions
From our analysis, we can conclude that the room for institutional entrepreneurship strongly 
depends upon the characteristics of the targeted institutional regime. When such a regime 
is characterized by much fragmentation and a long-lasting legacy of deeply entrenched 
values, it is very difficult to undertake the initial activities toward entrepreneurship. Related 
to this, we can conclude that a call for institutional entrepreneurship is important, but is far 
from a panacea for the problems of institutional change or redesign (Lowndes & Roberts, 
2013). Entrepreneurship is important to put pressure upon such a process, but within a 
highly diversified and path-dependent regime with large interests at stake, it is questionable 
whether focusing on endogenous factors, advocated by Wijen and Ansari (2006), is powerful 
enough to bring about regime change in a non-incremental way.
Our analysis underscores that successful entrepreneurship in the case of climate adapta-
tion is also highly dependent upon the presence of a window of opportunity. Without such a 
window (like an opportunity to connect interests or an external shock like a flood), it is very 
difficult to create enough sense of urgency to implement innovative adaptation strategies 
(Bakir, 2009). Finally, from our case we can conclude that successful entrepreneurship is 
difficult to realize for an individual with a specific role or responsibility. Effective entre-
preneurship is much more a collaborative effort because changing an institutional regime 
means changing the institutional rules of the game of many different actors with their own 
ambitions and conditions (Wijen & Ansari, 2006).
With regard to suggestions for further investigations on the value of institutional entre-
preneurship for renewal of existing policy regimes, we propose three topics: (1) the specific 
institutional and societal contexts in which entrepreneurship emerges, (2) the intricacies of 
innovation in public policy regimes and (3) the specific leadership competencies required 
to forge productive coalitions in an institutional void.
First, the added value of institutional entrepreneurship for establishing complex collec-
tive goods and services, such as flood risk safety, urban living conditions and protection of 
publicly funded and owned civic infrastructure, seems to be limited. Especially in the insti-
tutional context and administrative culture of Dutch water management policy, residents 
and private investors are used to the fact that ‘the government’ takes good care of national 
water safety. As a consequence, no one even thinks of taking the initiative for renewing the 
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existing flood risk management policy. This illustrates the importance for further exam-
ination of the relation between the specific institutional context, the extent of embedded 
agency and strategies of entrepreneurship that can succeed in such contexts.
Second, the intricacies of innovation in the public–private domain are perhaps best 
captured by the observation that ‘everyone is waiting for everybody else, a situation of 
catch 22’ (WRR, 2008). This is partly the ‘normal’ problem in organizing collective action, 
but it also has to do with ambiguity about responsibilities that give actors the possibility to 
do nothing and to look at each other. The question here is whether this type of behavior is 
omnipresent in situations when it is necessary to engage in new and uncertain pathways.
Third, the case study shows that forging a coalition for an issue that is complex stretches 
across policy domains and is not really perceived as urgent, (yet) requiring specific coalesc-
ing competencies. It could be worthwhile to explore what type of leadership qualities are 
necessary to combine working with diverging values, ambitions and formal responsibilities, 
with keeping a keen eye on emerging opportunities.
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